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Abstract
This paper estimates central bank policy preferences in the
case of the European Monetary Union and of the UK. We do so,
by adopting the framework suggested by Cecchetti and Ehrmann
(1999), which, however, we extent in two respects. First, we
allow policy preferences to be asymmetric by assuming that in-
ation and output follow a Markov process. Second, following
Bean (1998) we introduce dynamics in the supply and demand
relationships. In doing so we estimate state-dependent policy
frontiers. Empirical results from the static model show that mon-
etary policy in the European Monetary Union and in the UK put
a lot of weight on price stability. However, there is evidence of
price puzzle especially in the high volatility regime. The price
puzzle might be the by-product of frequent realingments in the
European Monetary System currency crises in 1992, 1993 and
1995 and of the more recent 2008 nancial crisis. Estimates of
the optimal policy frontier suggest that although the UK enjoys
higher anti-inationary credibility, it also faces a higher trade-
o¤ between ination and output variability than the European
Monetary Union.
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1 Introduction
The primary objective of the European Central Bank (ECB), stated in
Article 2 of its statute, is to maintain price stability (see, also, Arti-
cle 3 of the Maastricht Treaty). Svensson (2001) argues that dening
price stability boils down to establishing a monetary-policy loss function.
Svensson (op. cit.) also argues that maintaining price stability involves
minimizing the policy makers loss function.1 While it is easy to show
that under a quadratic loss function and linear dynamic of the economic
state variables, the optimal interest rate rule is a linear function of ina-
tion and output gap, the estimated coe¢cients are a convolution of the
parameters describing policy preferences and the underlying economic
structure. Hence, the estimated policy rule is a reduced-form model,
which cannot be used to address questions concerning policy evaluation.
However, policy evaluation based on the observed outcomes might not
reect only policy preferences. More concretely, changes of monetary
policy rule might be driven by changes of policy targets and/or changes
of external shocks.
Although there is a large number of studies, which analyse the great
moderation in the US, the focus of this literature was mainly the question
of whether the greater stability observed in the 1990s was the outcome
of an aggressive anti-inationary policy or the lack of supply shocks.
Only few authors ( Cecchetti et al. 1999; Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999;
Cecchetti, 1998; Dennis 2006; Favero and Raveli 2003) have attempted
to estimate deep factors such as policy preferences which led to changes
of monetary policy. To estimate changes of policy preferences, the stud-
ies above split the sample into two di¤erent periods by implementing
structural break tests. One of the main disadvantages of this approach
is that in a forward looking model agents form expectations accounting
for possible parameter changes in the future.
Relevant literature in economics shows that macro-variables might
follow a Markov regime switching process. If this is the case then the
policy makers loss function and the optimal policy rule that emerges
from it become state dependent. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) argue
that the loss function of a central bank depends on the state that the
economy is in. They use a loss function the implication of which is that
the central bank is more reactive to ination deviation from its target
when the economy is in expansion rather than in contraction. Alter-
natively, central bank reacts more strongly to the output gap deviation
1Three alternative policies are considered, namely, commitment to a simple instru-
ment rule such as the Taylor rule, forecast targeting (for instance ination-forecast
targeting) and intermediate targeting.
2
from its target level in recession than in expansion. Beck et al. (2002)
generalize this framework and assume a state dependent loss function.
Svensson and Williams (2005) and Blake and Zambolli (2006) examine
the impact of model uncertainty on the optimal policy rule. Both of
these studies assume a quadratic loss function subject to state variables,
the dynamics of which follow a Markov process.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the monetary policy prefer-
ences of the EMU countries and the UK. The reason for this attempt is
simply because recently the consensus on optimal monetary policy has
changed within a short period of time. Evidence of high ination and
low economic growth before the collapse of Lehmann Brothers raises the
question of whether the ECB and the Bank of England should focus on
achieving their ination target or helping economic growth by relaxing
monetary policy. However, the latter option raises questions about the
credibility of the ECB and the Bank of England concerning the objective
of price stability. An alternative consideration emerges in view of the
period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when major central banks
around the world have reduced interest rates at historical low levels. The
debate has now moved on to the question of whether a loose monetary
policy should be coordinated with an expansionary scal policy. To this
end we estimate the monetary policy preferences of EMU and of the UK
by adopting a framework suggested by Cecchetti and Ehrmann, (1999).2
The contribution of this study is to estimate optimal policy prefer-
ences accounting for changes of business cycles. We do so by assuming
that the dynamics of state variables follow a Markov process. In this set
up the policy reaction function becomes state dependent. We assume
that policy preferences are constant across the di¤erent regimes. In do-
ing so we can estimate changes of optimal preferences driven by supply
shocks. We also compute the actual and optimal policy frontier both
for expansion and recession. For given policy preferences any deviation
between the actual and optimal policy frontier will reect changes in the
e¢ciency of monetary policy across di¤erent regimes. We have adopted
the same approach used by Checchetti et al. (2006), who develop a
method for allocating policy performance changes to e¢cient monetary
policy, to reduction in the variability of supply shocks and to changes in
the structure of the economy.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a general theo-
retical framework of optimal monetary policy. The subsequent section
describes the construction of state dependent optimal-policy frontiers.
2The same approach has been used by Cecchetti et al. (2006). For alternative
methods of estimating policy preferences see Dennis (2006), Favero and Rovelli (2003)
and Salemi (1995).
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Section 4 explains the econometric methodology used to estimate mon-
etary policy preferences. Section 5 discusses the data utilized and the
empirical results of the study. Section 6 summarises and concludes.
2 Estimation of Monetary Policy Preferences
This section describes how a theoretical model concerning monetary pol-
icy preferences can be brought to data. We follow Cecchetti (1998) and
derive the trade-o¤ between ination and output gap variability by as-
suming that a central bank is faced with a quadratic loss function (QLF),
which is subject to linear dynamics of output and prices. We begin by
minimizing the central banks loss function as in (1):
L = E[(   )2 + (1  )(y   y)2] (1)
subject to (2) and (3):
yt = (it   dt) + st;  < 0 (2)
t =  (it   dt)  st (3)
where  is ination,  is the ination target set by a central bank, y
denotes output gap, y is the target of output gap an it is the short-
term nominal interest rate. The coe¢cient  is the weight that the
central bank attaches to ination relative to output stabilization,  is
the inverse slope of the supply curve and  is the slope of the aggregate
demand; dt and st stand for the demand and the supply shocks respec-
tively. The combination of the quadratic loss function and the linear
constrains yields a linear reaction function:
it = adt + bst (4)
Substituting this optimal policy into (2) and (3) we obtain the respective
variances 2y and 
2
. The can write (1) in terms of 
2
y and 
2
: Then
minimisation of (1) yields:
a = 1 (5)
and
b =
(   )  
(1  2) + 2
(6)
The main implication of (5) and (6) is that policy makers completely
o¤set demand shocks in terms of both output and ination. This is so
since demand shocks move output and ination in the same direction.
A trade-o¤ between output and ination is caused by supply shocks.
Substituting (5) and (6) into 2y and 
2
 , it is easy to show that the
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ratio 2y=
2
 is a function of policy preferences ; and of the inverse of
the slope of the supply curve ; as in (7):
2y
2
= [

(1  )
]2 (7)
Using the actual values of 2 and 
2
y and the estimated value of ;
we can infer the policy preference parameter . Equation (7) has the
property that for  = 0 (the central bank only cares about output gap
variability), 2y=
2
 = 0. Likewise, for  = 1 (the central bank only
cares about ination variability), 2y=
2
 = 1:
3 Cecchetti (1998) shows
that central banks that care about the aggregate price path lose little
by putting some weight on the output gap (i.e.  < 1). Alternatively,
central banks that care about output gap variability are faced with a
substantially worse position if they decide to target the path of the price
level.
There is empirical evidence (Hamilton et. al 1996; Ang et al. 1998)
that macroeconomic variables follow a regime switching process. Thus,
we can extent the loss function (1) to account for a state-depedent Philips
curve:
Et[LtjSt;
t] = ptLe + (1  pt)LR (8)
Et[LtjSt;
t] = pt[e
2 + (1  e)yt
2] + (1  pt)[R
2 + (1  R)yt
2](9)
subject to (10) and (11):
yt = St(it   dt) + st (10)
t =  (it   dt)  st (11)
where 
t is the information set available at time t, St is an unobserved
state variable at time t, pt indicates the probability for given 
t; St is
in expansion (i.e. P (S = ej
t), the subscript e and R indicate that the
relevant variables are in expansion and recession respectively. In line
with the linear model we can show that optimal policy frontier become
state-depedent:
2y
2
=

St
St(St   1)
2
(12)
Equation (12) shows that for give values of 2y and 
2
 the policy prefer-
ences of central bank change as the slope of supply (1=St) curve changes
across di¤erent regime.
3We can trace out the entire output-ination variability frontier by allowing  to
vary between 0 and 1.
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3 Estimation of Optimal Policy Frontiers
To make the analysis more realistic we introduce dynamics in both de-
mand and supply curves. We do so, by following Bean (1998), who uses
Svenssons (1997) ination forecast targeting model, to derive an optimal
policy frontier for the UK. We also extent the work of Bean (1998) by
obtaining a state dependent policy frontier using a framework suggested
by Blake and Zampolli (2006) and Svensson and Williams (2005).
3.1 Optimal Policy Frontier: The Linear Case
Bean (1998) considers the problem of
min
it
L(; y) =
1
2
(2t + y
2
t ) (13)
subject to
t+1 = t + 1yt + st+1 (14)
yt+1 = 1yt   2it + dt+1 (15)
In this model the best that a central bank can do is to a¤ect ination in
two periods by choosing the optimal level of output at time t+1. Thus,
the ination dynamics can be written as
t+2 = t+1jt + 1yt+1jt + st+2 + st+1 + 1dt+1
Given the linear quadratic structure, the optimal policy is given by
yt+1jt =  t+1jt =  [t + 1yt] (16)
where  is a positive parameter that depends on :We obtain the optimal
reaction function from equation (16) by solving with respect to nominal
interest rate:
it =
[+ 1]yt + t
2
(17)
Substituting (17) into (14) and (15) and lagging the resulting equations
by one period we can write the evolution of y and  as
yt
t

=

 1 
1 1
 
yt 1
t 1

+

dt
st

(18)
We compute the unconditional variances of output gap and ination as
V ar(yt)
V ar(t)

=
1
2  1

2 
1
1
1
1
  1+ 2
 
2dt
2st

(19)
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4Following Bean (1998) we minimize V ar(t)+V ar(yt) with respect to
the optimal feedback coe¢cient : Bean (1998) shows that the solution
to this is
 =
 1 +
p
21 + 4
2
(20)
(20) indicates that we can only estimate policy as an e¢cient policy
frontier but not the policy preferences : By varying  we can trace out
an optimal e¢cient frontier that trade-o¤s ination variability against
output gap variability.
3.2 A state dependent Optimal Policy Frontier
We extent the work of Bean (1998) and estimate state dependent optimal
policy frontiers by adopting the Markov jump linear quadratic (MJLQ)
model suggested by Zampolli (2006) and Blake and Zampolli (2006).5
Policy makers minimize an intertemporal loss function:
1X
t=0
tL(xt) = x
0
tR(St)xt (21)
where 0 <   1 is the discount factor, xt = [yt t]
0 is a vector of state
variables and R(St) is given by
R(St) =

(St) 0
0 1

The random variable St is assumed to form a Markov chain in  =
f1; 2; :::Ng with transition probability matrix P = (pij)
0
ij =2: The tran-
sition probability pij is the probability that the economy switches from
the current state i to future state j. We assume that the policy makers
know the current state of the economy but they are uncertain about the
future state. The minimization problem is subject to a reduced form
state dependent linear dynamic of the economy
xt+1=A(St+1)xt +B(St+1)ut + t+1 (22)
~N(0;) (23)
where
A(St+1) =

1(St+1) 0
1(St+1) 1

; B(St+1) =

 2(St+1)
0

and t+1 =

dt+1
st+1

(24)
4In the process of obtaining (19) we have applied the property that if Yt = FYt 1+
E; where Y is a random vector, F is a matrix of coe¢cients, and E is a vector of a
white noise process, then: V ec[V ar(Y )] = [I   (F 
 F )] 1V ec[V ar(E)].
5Zambolli (2006) used MJLQ to study monetary policy under regime shifts with-
out including forward-looking variables.
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The matrices A and B depend on the value of the unobserved-state
vector Si; i 2 f1; 2; ::Ng:: Solving the problem requires jointly solving
the following set of Belman equations
v(xt)btjt=max
rt
fL(xt; )btjt + E[v(xt+1)bt+1jt]g (25)
v(xt)btjt=max
rt
fL(xt; )btjt + E[v(xt+1)Pbtjt]g (26)
v(xt; i)=max
rt
fL(xt; )btjt +  NX
j=1
pijE[v(xt+1)]g; i = 1; 2; :::N (27)
where v(x) is the continuation value of the dynamic programing problem,btjt is a N 1 vector whose i element is the conditional expectation that
the unobserved state of the world is St = j; given the information at time
t and St 1 = i and P = fpijg: Given the linear quadratic nature of the
problem and assuming further that the value function is quadratic, i.e.
v(xt; i) = x
0Vix + d; the rst order conditions will give a set of decision
rules of the following form:
u(x; i) =  Fixt (28)
where by substituting (28) into (25) and equating the terms in the
quadratic form we obtain a set of Riccati equations
Vi=Ri + G[A
0V AjS = i] (29)
 2G[A0V BjS= i]([B0V BjS = i]) 1G[B0V AjS = i]
where i = 1; :::; N . G() is a conditional operator dened as follows:
G[X 0V Y jS = i] = [Pbtjt(X 0V Y )] = NX
j=1
X
0
j(pijVj)Yj
where X = A;B; Y = A;B: Having found Vi from the solution of (29)
we can estimate the matrices
Fi = (G[B
0V BjS = i] 1G[B0V AjS = i) (30)
Assuming  = 1 and substituting (30) into (28) and the resulting equa-
tion into (24) we obtain:
xt+1=A(St+1)xt  B(St+1)F (St+1)xt + t+1 (31)
=(St+1)xt + t+1 (32)
where
(St+1) = A(St+1) B(St+1)F (St+1)
8
and (31) implies that the variance covariance matrix of the state vector
xt+1 is regime dependent:
vec(x) = [I   (St+1)
 (St+1)]
 1vec() (33)
where x = E(xtx
0
t): The diagonal element of (33) compute the regime
dependent variance of the state vector x :
Diag[vec(x)] = Diag
 
[I   (St+1)
 (St+1)]
 1vec()

(34)
However, (St+1) is a complicate function ofA(St+1); B(St+1) and V (St+1):
Thus, we can compute regime-depedent optimal policy frontiers by vary-
ing the values of vector V (St+1):
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4 Econometric Methodology
The next step is to identify the impact of monetary policy on output
and ination. We need to identify and estimate the impulse response
functions of output and ination to a monetary shock. Cecchetti and
Ehrmann (1999) use the structural VAR approach suggested by King
et al. (1991) to identify the monetary transmission mechanism. The
King et al. (op. cit.) identication scheme is based on cointegrating
relationships in a n-variable system. Complete identication of the n-
variable system requires [n(n  1)=2] restrictions.7
Checchetti (1998) argues that the VARmodel used to estimate the re-
sponses of output and prices to interest rate changes presumes that these
responses remain constant over the sample used in the estimation. Thus,
the estimates of policy preferences by Checchetti and Ehrmann (1999)
are based on the assumption that VAR parameters remain constant over
a signicant historical period. However, in the case of the EMS mone-
tary policy, it went through di¤erent regimes. This implies that we need
to adopt a statistical model which accounts for regime changes. Here, we
estimate (22) by employing a structural Markov regime-switching VAR
(SMRS VAR) suggested by Ehrmann et al. (2003). As another check for
the use of SMRS VAR model we follow Hamilton and Lin (1996) and
test for parameter stability using a test suggested by Andrews (1993).
6If we use yt+1jt as a control variable then we can obtain a state-depedent version
of (19) and (20).
7If among the n-variable system there are r cointegrating vectors there will be k
common stochastic trends, where k = (n r). To identify the k stochastic trends King
et al. (1991) impose [k(k  1)=2] restriction in the long-run matrix. Alternatively, to
identify the r transitory shocks King et al. (op.cit.) impose [r(r  1)=2] restrictions
on the short-run matrix.
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We also apply various tests for structural breaks.8 Evidence of struc-
tural breaks indicates that variables went through di¤erent states rather
than having a stochastic trends. Table A1 in the appendix presents re-
sults from tests of parameter stability and structural breaks. We have
used the Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) methods
to test for the presence of a break in the stochastic process of our macro-
variables. The above tests can also be used to identify multiple breaks
in a series by incorporating them in an iterative scheme (algorithm) and
apply them to sub-samples of the series. In this paper, we have employed
the algorithm proposed by Karoglou (2009), and explained in the Ap-
pendix, which is more robust than the basic binary division algorithm
to the presence of transitional periods.
In a standard SVAR the underlying structural model is identied
by imposing restrictions on the moving average representation of an
unrestricted VAR. A SMRS VAR is a two-step procedure combining
two important developments of VAR analysis: Markov regime-switching
and identication. In the rst step we estimate an MRS VAR model,
where we allow all estimated parameters to be state dependent:
Xt =
0
@ytt
it
1
A ; c(st) =
0
@c1;stc2;st
c3;st
1
A ; u =
0
@u1;stu2;st
u3;st
1
A ;
Xt = c(st) +
pX
j=1
A(st)Xt j +  (st)t+B(st)ut (35)

(st) = E[B(st)utu
0
tB(st)
0] = B(st)InB(st)
0 (36)
In the second step we identify B(st): Identication of B(st) requires n
2
restrictions. [n(n + 1)=2] restrictions are imposed upon equation (36)
because the variance covariance matrix of the error term is an identity
matrix (i.e., utu
0
t = u = In). This implies that full identication needs
extra [n(n + 1)=2] restrictions. Sims (1980) derives these restrictions
by ordering endogenous variables recursively. In this set up endogenous
variables are ordered and it is assumed that the fundamental distur-
bances have contemporaneous e¤ects on the variable itself and on all the
other variables below it. The choice of which restriction to impose is
subject to the structural VAR literature.9 We choose the recursive form
8We could test for the number of states using the Hansen (1992) test. However,
this test is computationally demanding and has low power when dynamics are in-
cluded in the data generation process. Mitchell and Mouratidis (2004) using the
Hansen (1992) test show that the growth rate of industrial production of nine EMU
countries were subject to regime switching.
9For a detailed review of the structural VAR literature see Canova (2007).
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of identication by imposing the restriction that the policy instrument
does not enter into ination and output equation contemporaneously.10
This is consistent with the empirical model of Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999) and the theoretical model of Svensson (1997). We also impose
the restriction that ination does not a¤ect output contemporaneously.
Cecchetti (1996) argues that when we try to discern the relationship
between the policy instrument and the target variables we need to add
more variables to the model. His argument is based on the empirical
ndings of Sims (1992) and Christiano et al. (1996a; 1996b). Sims
(1992) using a VAR including only prices, output and interest rate nds a
positive reaction of prices to interest rate shock. This puzzling result has
been called the price puzzle. The most commonly accepted explanation
of the price puzzle is that the variables included in the VAR do not
reect the full information set of central banks. This is so because policy
is likely to respond to forecast of future economic conditions. VARs
may attribute the subsequent movements in output and ination to the
policy action. In other words the price puzzle is an artifact of omitted
variable problem. Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) show that the omitted
variable is the by-product of passive monetary policy which leads to
violation of the Taylor principle and indeterminacy. Indeterminacy, as
Lubic and Schorfheide (2004) underline, introduce two new elements.
First, structural shocks are not uniquely identied and sunspots become
important in generating business cycles uctuations. One solution to
the prize puzzle is to include commodity prices or other asset prices in
the VAR. Since these prices are sensitive to changing forecasts of future
ination, they can be used as proxies of the central banks additional
information.11
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) estimate policy preferences for the
EMU countries including at least four variables. We also employ a four-
variable model by introducing a long-term interest into a trivariate MRS
model. We do so because a long-term interest rate is a forward-looking
variable reecting market expectations. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999)
use dummy variables to account for institutional changes. However, our
experiment with linear VAR provides evidence of non-normality and het-
eroscedasticity. This implies that there are structural breaks or regime
10The same recursive identication scheme has been used by Ehrmann et al. (2003).
11Barth and Ramey (2001) provide an alternative interpretation of the price puzzle.
They argue that a contractionary monetary policy a¤ects both aggregate demand and
aggregate supply. For example, an increase in the rate of interest not only inuences
demand negatively it also raises the cost of holding inventories. This negative supply
shock will increase prices and reduce output. In this interpretation, the price puzzle
is due to the cost channel rather than to a misspecied VAR.
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switching changes (see Canova, 2007) in line with the history of EMS.12
We employ an MRS model because of the history of the EMS system
and also, because of recent empirical evidence that macro-variables are
subject to regime switching (see Ang and Bekaert, 1998).
In line with Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) we compute the inverse
slope 1=(st) at each regime as the 12-quarter average of the impact
of policy shock on output, divided by the 12-quarter average impact
on ination. The state dependent unconditional volatilities of output
and ination are measured using the smooth probabilities regarding the
current economic state.
5 Data and Empirical Results
This section analyses empirical results concerning both the static and
dynamic model. We focus on the case of the EMU countries and the
UK. In what follows we utilize both a trivariate and a quadravariate
MRS model to estimate equation (35). The trivariate MRS VAR model
includes the policy instrument and the target variables. We use on a
monthly basis the three-month treasury bill rate as a proxy for the policy
instrument. The treasury bill is available both for all countries and
for the whole period of investigation.13 We also use monthly CPI and
industrial production to construct the ination rate and the industrial
production growth rate.14
5.1 Estimation of Policy Preferences: The Case of
the Static Model
We compute policy preferences and the slope of the supply curve for two
di¤erent samples. The two samples cover the periods from March 1979
to December 1998 and from March 1979 to August 2008.15 We choose
these two periods to investigate whether the introduction of the single
European currency had any impact on policy preferences.
Table 1 presents the results from the trivariate and four-variable MRS
models. We distinguish each regime on the basis of their volatilities. We
call regime 1, the regime with a low volatility and regime 2 the regime
12In the period from 1979 to 1986 the EMS experienced 11 realingments followed
by a stable period up to the currency crises of the 1990s. The EMS was the subject
of speculative attacks in 1993 and 1995.
13We could also use the short-term money market rate given by the 60b line of IFS
data base. However, it is only available for the period before the introduction of the
European single currency.
14Data for CPI and industrial production were extracted from the lines 64 and 99
of the IFS data base.
15We have excluded the recent nancial crisis because there are not many ex-post
observations.
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with the high volatility.16 The rst observation is that most of the
(st)s are very high. Estimated policy preferences for the full sample
(i.e. March 1979 to August 2008) indicate that after the introduction
of the single European currency, countries increased the weight assigned
to price stability. This is so because monetary policy is conducted by a
new institution, the ECB where single objective is price stability. The
need to earn anti-inationary credibility led the ECB to put emphasis
on price stability. It is worth noting that both the EMU and the UK
put more weight on price stability, than on output gap stability, in the
regime where the slope of the supply curve (i.e. 1=) is atter. Countries
emphasize price stability in regimes where the disination cost in terms
of output gap is high. This might be due to the e¤ort of EMU countries
to establish anti-inationary credibility.
Table 1: Estimated Policy Preferences
Period 1979 : 03  1998 : 12 Period 1979 : 03  08 : 2008
Parameters EMU UK EMU UK
3 Variables
1 -3.879 -1.550 -2.594 -38.159
2 -0.729 -0.705 -2.006 -2.345
1 0.951 0.777 0.928 0.988
2 0.784 0.613 0.909 0.840
4 Variables
1 -2.011 -1.192 -1.049 -34.192
2 -0.225 -1.156 -0.601 -10.745
1 0.908 0.721 0.837 0.987
2 0.525 0.715 0.747 0.959
Figure 1 shows the probability of regime 1 (i.e. low volatility regime).
In line with empirical regularities the probability of regime 1 in EMU
is low for the period before 1986 where eleven realignments took place
in the EMS. The probability of regime 1 is also low in 1990 where the
German unication and the low economic growth in EMU raised doubts
about the optimality of low ination policy pursued by the Budesbank.
The probability of low volatility regime falls during the speculative at-
tacks in 1992, 1993 and 1995.
16Here, in both cases, the high volatility regime coincides with the low economic
growth regime.
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Figure 1: Smooth probabilities of regime 1 for the UK and the EMU.
Alternatively, in the UK the probability of low volatility regime is
broadly in line with narrative evidence. More concretely, Benati (2008)
shows that the long-run response to ination was weaker for the period
before 1979-1990 and there was a marked increase under the Margaret
Thatcher administration; there was a further increase after the introduc-
tion of implicit ination targeting in October 1992. Thus, the probability
of regime 1 is low in periods where monetary policy accommodated in-
ationary pressure. In doing so expected ination becomes self-fullling.
This is so because violation of the Taylor principle will generate multi-
ple equilibria and the expectations become self-fullling.17 This implies
17The Taylor principle states that if the coe¢cient of ination in the standard
Taylor rule is smaller than one, then the rational expectations model has multiple
equilibria and expectations become self-fullling. However, Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) show equilibrium (i.e determinacy and indeterminacy) is a system property
and depends on the interaction between the parameters of the Taylor rule and of
14
that if the high volatility regime coincides with passive monetary policy
then in regime 2 sunspots will lead to the price puzzle. Our results are
consistent with Benati (2008), who using a time-varying structural VAR
analysis, shows that there is violation of the Taylor principle during the
1980s, where the estimated long-run ination coe¢cient uctuates be-
tween 0.7 and 0.8. However, after the introduction of ination targeting
in October 1992 the long-run coe¢cient on ination increased substan-
tially reaching a value of 1.4. The probability of regime 1 is also low
for the period between 2001 and 2003. This is in line with Groen et al.
(2009) who show, by developing a multivariate extension of the CUSUM
test, that the UK RPI ination was subject to structural breaks after
2001, 2003 and 2005.18
Figure 2 and 3 are based on trivariate MRS-SVAR model and present
the response of ination to monetary policy shocks both for the UK
and the EMU. There is a evidence of price puzzle in both regimes but
it is a lot more persistent and stronger in the high volatility regime.
Although this reects that market expectations are more important in
the high volatility regime than in the low volatility regime, one should
bear in mind that the price puzzle might be an artifact of an omitted
variable problem. Canova et al. (2006) get around the omitted variable
problem by using proxies of expected ination. Here, we use as a proxy
of expected ination the spread between the 6-year long-term interest
rate and the three-month treasury bill. However, the price puzzle is still
present in the augmented four-variable MRS-SVARmodel.19 Evidence of
price puzzle after accounting for expected ination indicates that either
the proxy of expected ination is not accurate or the price puzzle is
due to supply shocks. This is so because the implication of the impulse
response from a mis-pecied VAR is similar to the implication of the
response to a supply shock. This raises some concern for policy makers
in distinguishing policy shocks from supply shocks especially for regimes
with high uncertainty.
the structural parameters. So a low ination coe¢cient in policy rules should be
considered as an indication of a potential indeterminacy.
18Groen et al. (2009) argue that there may have been temporary breaks induced
by the large volatilities in housing and energy after 2000.
19For the sake of brevity we do not present the impulse response function of the
four- variable MRS-SVAR model here. The relevant graphs are available from the
authors upon request.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Function of Prices to Interest Rate Shock: The
Case of the UK.
Figure 3: Impulse Response Function of Prices to Interest Rate Shock: The
Case of the EMU.
It is worth noting that Castelnuovo and Surico (2006) show that
the price puzzle disappears when estimation of SVAR focuses on the
period between 1993 and 2006. Alternatively, Caglayan et al. (2011)
show that the price puzzle is still present once the sample is extended
to include the recent nancial crisis. Although we exclude the recent
nancial crisis, our results justify those of Caglayan et al. (2011). The
key element that di¤erentiates the price puzzle before the crisis in 1992
and the price puzzle before the recent nancial crises is that the latter is
not the outcome of a passive monetary policy but rather the by-product
of poor banking regulation. The introduction of implicit and explicit
ination targeting in 1992 and 1997 in the UK respectively, has increased
16
the long-run response of interest rate to ination above one. This implies
that the underlying factor to price puzzle before the nancial crisis in the
end of 2008 was excessive lending and poor banking regulation. Haldane
et al. (2007) show that UK banks increased their unsecured exposure
along with UK households securing debt to gures mounting around 32%
of UK banks total lending. Haldane at al. (op. cit.) also explain that
households were very sensitive to adverse shocks and there were signals
of stress with the number of personal insolvencies sharply increasing
before the 2007-2009 nancial crises.
The UK economy went through a recession in the early 1990s. How-
ever, being a member of the ERM, the UK could not use monetary policy
to boost domestic economic growth. The economic outlook of the UK de-
teriorated as the German unication and the subsequent contractionary
policy implemented by Germany did not help unemployment in the UK.
The options for the UK, at that time, were either to opt out of the ERM
and achieve higher economic growth by devaluing the British pound or
su¤er economic recession by staying in the ERM. The markets bet in
favor of the former option and in conjuction with a weak response by
the Bank of England to long-run ination, market expectations became
self-fullling. Thus, devaluation and the subsequent ination materi-
alized by a passive monetary policy before the crisis in 1992. Under
such circumstances, it appears that the price puzzle is the outcome of
expected ination, which is an extra state variable generated by a pas-
sive monetary policy. Our results are consistent with Castelnuovo and
Surico (2006), who argue that under indeterminacy the positive relation-
ship between ination and interest rate appears spurious and it is due to
model mis-pecication due to violation of the Taylor principle and the
subsequent indeterminacy.
Evidence of price puzzle in the pre-EMU is due to the beginning of
the EMS when there was high ination di¤erential between Germany and
the rest of the EMS member countries. Thus, eleven realignments took
place before inationary convergence across the EMS member countries
was achieved in the early 1990s. However, the cost of the inationary
convergence was a real exchange rate appreciation and current account
decit for countries such as Italy, the UK, Spain and Portugal. Spain
and Italy experienced higher ination rates than the EMS average dur-
ing 1987-1992. During this period, without any realignment, tensions
were building up for these two countries in the form of growing loss of
competitiveness (see De Grauwe 1997). The choice for these countries
was either to devalue or to deate their economies but su¤ering further
loss of competitiveness. Italy opted out of the EMS after the specu-
lative attack in 1992 and Spain increased the band around the central
17
parity. In 1993 the overvaluation of the currencies of the countries in
the periphery was corrected but the market was left unsure in terms of
the core currencies, such as the Belgian and the French francs and the
Danish krone, which did not seem to provide evidence of overvaluation.
Eichengreen and Wyploz (1993) and Kenen (1995) argue that the crisis
in 1993 was caused by market expectations about the future stance of
French policy because they thought that France and some other smaller
countries were in di¤erent cyclical positions to that of Germany.20 In
1995 the lira, peseta and the Swedish krona were under pressure because
of market concerns about the ability of those countries to serve their high
domestic debt.
5.2 Estimation of State Dependent Policy Frontiers:
The Case of the Dynamic Model
We trace out an e¢cient policy frontier of a trade-o¤ between output gap
variability and ination variability by varying (St+1) from zero to in-
nity. However, in order to calculate the e¢cient frontier we need three
pieces of information: the variance of demand shocks 2d(St+1);the vari-
ance of supply shocks 2s(St+1)and the slope of the supply curve 1(St+1):
We start by estimating a state dependent version of (14) and (16) using
MRS models. Then we substitute the values of 1(St+1); 
2
d(St+1)
and
2s(St+1); so obtained, into (St+1):
Figure 4 presents the e¢cient policy frontiers of the UK, both in low
and high volatility regimes. The striking thing with these frontiers is
that they are steep and the optimal points are very close for weights
in the range of [2,5]. This has an important implication concerning the
credibility of the Bank of England. A rather wide range of weights on
output against ination will lead to similar points on the policy frontier.
Although a steep policy frontier indicates that the Bank of England has
little to loose in terms of credibility, by increasing the weight on output
it also implies that emphasis on price stability is relatively expensive in
terms of output.
The optimal policy frontiers for the EMU, presented in Figures 4
and 5 di¤er from those of the UK in two respects. First, Figure 5 also
shows that the standardized policy frontier of the UK is steeper than the
policy frontier of the EMU.21 Second, the size of the trade-o¤ between
ination variability and output gap variability is a lot lower for the EMU
than for the UK. Although the UK enjoys higher credibility concerning
20The French and Belgian franc initially dropped by 3-4 percent leading to an
increase of band around the central parity 15 per cent.
21For ease of exposition we have only presented the policy frontiers of the high
volatility regime.
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the objective of price stability than the EMU, it faces a high trade-o¤
between ination and output gap stability. These results are in line
with evidence from the static model where the UK not only does it put
less weight on ination variability but also it has reduced this weight
substantially after 2006.
Figure 4: State dependent optimal policy frontiers. Note: the (grey) line
with the crosses depicts the optimal policy frontier in the high volatility
regime; the (black) line with the circles depicts the optimal policy frontier in
the low volatility regime.
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Figure 5: Standardised state dependent optimal policy frontiers in the high
and low volatility regimes. Note: the black line depicts the optimal policy
frontier in the high volatility regime for the UK; the grey line depicts the
optimal policy frontier in the high volatility regime for the EU. It is worth
mentioning that the corresponding graph for the low volatility regime is
almost identical.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to estimate the monetary policy preferences of
a number of EMU countries and the UK. We do so, by adopting the
framework suggested by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999). We extent the
work of Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) in two respects. First, we allow
policy preferences to be state dependent by assuming the data generating
process (DGP) of ination and output gap to follow a Markov process.
Second, we introduce dynamics into the relevant supply and demand
curves. However, when introducing dynamics into the static model used
by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), we can only estimate an optimal
policy frontier rather than policy preferences explicitly.
Empirical results from the static model show that monetary policy
in the EMU and in the UK put a lot of weight on ination variability.
Alternatively, the impulse response function shows that there is price
puzzle especially in the high volatility regime. Evidence of price puzzle
in the EMU is the by-product of ination di¤erential across the EMU
member countries and of currency crises caused by real exchange rate
appreciation of the peripheral currencies with respect to the DM. The
price puzzle in the UK was due to a passive monetary policy followed
by the Bank of England prior to the speculative attack in 1992 and the
20
excess lending before the start of the recent nancial crisis in September
2008. Estimates of state dependent optimal policy frontiers show that
the Bank of England enjoys higher anti-inationary credibility and a
higher trade-o¤ between ination and output gap variability than the
ECB.
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Appendix 1: Detecting structural changes
The algorithm that is used in this paper to detect the possible presence
of multiple breaks comprises of the following six steps:
1. Calculate the test statistic under consideration (here the An-
drews, 1994, and the Andrews and Ploberger,1994) using the available
data.
2. If the statistic is above the critical value split the particular
sample into two parts at the corresponding point.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the rst segment until no more (ear-
lier) change-points are found.
4. Mark this point as an estimated change-point of the whole
series.
5. Remove the observations that precede this point (i.e. those
that constitute the rst segment).
6. Consider the remaining observations as the new sample and
repeat steps 1 to 5 until no more change-points are found.
The detected breaks for each series are simply all those that have
been detected after implementing this algorithm. The following table
depicts the break points for each series.
Series QA AP Series QA AP Series QA AP Series QA AP
Belgium rate 1985m05 1985m05 Germany rate 1982m11 1982m11 Netherlands rate 1982m09 1982m09 UK rate 1982m08 1982m08
1994m06 - 1995m05 1995m05 1995m10 1995m10 1992m12 1992m12
2001m12 - 2003m01 2003m01 1999m02 1999m02 2001m09 2001m09
2006m11 - 2006m09 2006m09 2003m01 2003m01 2004m07 2004m07
2008m10 - 2008m10 2008m10 2006m09 2006m09 2008m06 2008m06
Belgium infl 1985m05 1985m05 - - 2008m10 - UK infl 1980m06 1980m06
Belgium long 1985m11 1985m11 Germany infl 1982m08 1982m08 Netherlands infl 1982m05 1982m05 1990m12 1990m12
1996m10 1996m10 Germany long 1984m11 1984m11 Netherlands long 1983m01 1983m01 UK long 1982m10 1982m10
2002m10 2002m10 1997m08 1997m08 1996m11 1996m11 1997m06 1997m06
2007m05 2007m05 2003m01 2003m01 2003m01 2003m01 2000m12 2000m12
Belgium growth - - 2004m11 2004m11 2007m05 2007m05 2002m09 2002m09
France rate 1984m11 1984m11 2006m05 2006m05 2008m11 2008m11 UK growth - -
1995m12 1995m12 2008m09 2008m09 Netherlands growth - - Euro rate 1984m05 1984m05
2002m11 2002m11 Germany growth - - Spain rate 1984m02 1984m02 1996m02 1996m02
2006m09 2006m09 Italy rate 1986m06 1986m06 1996m05 1996m05 2001m12 2001m12
2008m10 2008m10 1996m12 - 1998m06 1998m06 2006m11 2006m11
France infl 1982m06 1982m06 1998m11 - 2002m01 2002m01 2008m10 2008m10
1986m07 1986m07 2007m02 - 2006m11 2006m11 Euro infl 1982m08 1982m08
1992m01 1992m01 Italy infl 1983m01 1983m01 2008m10 2008m10 1994m05 1994m05
France long 1985m05 1985m05 1995m08 1995m08 Spain infl 1986m02 1983m03 Euro long 1985m01 1985m01
1996m02 1996m02 - - 1995m06 1992m04 1996m11 -
2002m10 2002m10 Italy long 1985m01 1985m01 Spain long 1985m02 - 2002m10 -
2007m05 2007m05 1996m11 - 1996m11 - 2007m05 -
2008m11 2008m11 2002m09 - 2002m10 - 2008m11 -
France growth - - 2007m05 - 2007m05 - Euro growth - -
2008m06 - Spain growth - -
Italy growth - -
Table A1: Detected breaks using the Andrews-Quandt (Andrews, 1993)
and the Andrews-Ploberger test (Andrews and Ploberger, 1994)
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